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Abstract In this paper we study optimal policies for a central planner interested in maximizing
utility in an economy driven by a renewable resource. It is shown that the optimal consumption
path is sustainable only when the intrinsic growth rate of the resource is greater than the social
discount rate. The model is formulated as an infinite horizon optimal control problem. We
deal with the mathematical details of the problem, develop a precise notion for optimality and
establish the existence of optimal control at least when the condition for sustainability is met.
We apply the appropriate version of the Pontryagin maximum principle and show a numerical
simulation of the optimal feedback law. In the end we present the results along with physical
interpretations.
1. INTRODUCTION
Sustainability is a natural concern in a world moving con-
tinuously towards depletion of its resources. Consumption
of natural resources is driven sometimes due to the fulfill-
ment of basic human needs and sometimes due to various
growth imperatives. Whatever the case, consumption is
inevitable and so, exhaustible resources such as oil, gas and
other fossil fuels are sure to deplete at some point in time.
In contrast to this, renewable resources such as water,
fisheries and biofuels offer the possibility of sustainable
consumption in which the resource supply is guaranteed
not to deplete if consumption is reduced to a sufficiently
low level. This minimum level of consumption may be
achieved by influence of a governing body through imple-
mentation of effective policies. However, sustainability of
the resource may be of little use if it comes at the cost
of the essential benefits gained by consumption of that
resource by a society. The aim of the work presented here
is to determine the conditions under which sustainability
of a renewable resource is possible without compromising
the utility gained through consumption of that particular
resource. We do so by posing the model as an optimal
control problem.
There exist numerous studies regarding sustainability for
renewable resource consumption across multiple academic
disciplines. Our model for consumption compares with the
one used by Roopnarine [2013], where he has modeled
the Tragedy of the Commons (see Hardin [1968]) in open
access renewable resources by considering the behaviors
of individual agents. Here we do not explicitly consider
the behaviors of individual consumers, rather we consider
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the consumption pattern of the society as a whole. The
assumptions of homogeneity in the lumped parameter
model and existence of a central planner are part of our
chosen framework. Although this framework is not uncom-
mon (a survey is included in Beltratti et al. [1993]), the
limitations induced by it must be completely understood
before the deduced results are applied in practice. Con-
siderable efforts have been made in the specification of
more accurate models, for example by developing implicit
models and simulations both in the context of game theory
(Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel [2001], Faysse [2005]) and sim-
ilar agent-based and behavioral formulations (Deadman
[1999], Castillo and Saysel [2005]).
We formulate our model as an optimal control problem
whose solution is a welfare-maximizing upper bound on
quotas for individual consumption rates. There has been
much debate over the years on what measure of social
welfare to select for such optimal control problems (a
philosophical treatment of the subject can be found in Sen
[1985]). A common approach is the discounted utilitarian-
ism model in which the utility gained by consumption of
the resource is discounted over an infinite time horizon.
The discount rate may be assumed to be fixed, time
varying or uncertain (Farzin [1984], Duncan et al. [2011]).
However, discounting enforces a fundamental asymme-
try between present and future generations, which may
not agree with at least some definitions of sustainability
(see for instance, Tietenberg and Lewis [2000] and Solow
[1992]). Addressing this issue, the Chichilnisky criterion
developed by Chichilnisky [1996] gives a positive weight
to the limiting value of the utility, in addition to the dis-
counted utility function. This criterion is used by Beltratti
et al. [1993] to develop the Green Golden Rule for sustain-
ability in renewable resource consumption. The criteria we
take here is similar to the one assumed by Aseev et al.
[2010]. We take a discounted logarithmic utility function of
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the output as a measure of welfare, maximizing economic
growth over an infinite time horizon. Once the optimal
control problem is set up, we clearly define the notion of
optimality and also investigate the existence of an optimal
solution to the problem. We reformulate the problem to
an equivalent one with linear dynamics and prove their
equivalence. We then look for stable equilibrium points
(which directly correspond to sustainable consumption in
the sense described earlier) in the solutions of this problem
after application of the relevant version of Pontryagin’s
maximum principle.
In the end we present the conditions under which sus-
tainable consumption is possible, as guidelines for policy
making. We find that in order to ensure sustainability: 1)
measures must be taken in order to increase growth rate
of the resource, 2) policy makers should be able to plan
long-term i.e., they must plan over a large time horizon.
Although one is able to infer these guidelines through
intuition, the analysis we conduct here gives us an idea
about how high the resource growth rate and how large
the planning time horizon should be. Also, this provides
an additional validation to our model and enables us to
trust it as we move towards more complex scenarios for
which the results might not be so intuitive.
2. RESOURCE DYNAMICS
Here we assume a scenario in which the resource stock
dynamics have the following form
R˙(t) = g(R(t))− c(t)R(t),
where R(t) is the total resource quantity available at time
t, g(·) : R→ R is the growth function of the resource and
c(·) : R→ R represents the consumption rate of R at time
t. From the Gordon Schaefer model (Schaefer [1957]), c(t)
can also be interpreted as the amount of effort exerted in
harvesting the resource evaluated at time t. The growth
function g(·) is assumed to be logistic in nature and thus
the evolution of the resource over time is described by the
following differential equation
R˙(t) = r R(t)
(
1− R(t)
K
)
− c(t)R(t),
where r > 0 is the intrinsic growth rate of the resource
and K > 0 is the carrying capacity.
3. CONTROL SCHEME AND OBJECTIVE
FUNCTIONAL
For a social planner the objective of influencing the con-
sumption rate of the resource may be achieved through
multiple ways. An indirect and relatively long term ap-
proach would be to educate the consuming population
so as to alter their consumption behaviors as required.
Another approach would be to control the price, which
would affect the fraction of the population having access
to the resource, however this may have other economic
consequences especially if the resource in question plays a
vital role in the economy of the consuming society. Another
way would be to introduce exclusive access rights which is
also one of the solutions suggested by Hardin [1968] for
avoiding tragedies in open access resources. Here we are
interested in obtaining upper bounds on individual con-
sumption rates. This enables the social planner to assign
quotas of consumption to individual consumers. Indeed as
reported by Leal [1998], the practice of specifying quotas
to control resource consumption has been found in some
communities in the past as well. Thus we shall assume c(t)
to be our control variable.
We now describe an appropriate objective functional in
order to provide some measure of welfare for the social
planner to maximize. We assume that for every time
instant t ∈ [0,∞) the output Y (t) > 0 produced by
the economy, is described by a simplified Cobb-Douglas
production function
Y (t) = C
(
c(t)R(t)
)α
, where α ∈ (0, 1].
Here C > 0 represents the knowledge stock, which we
assume to be fixed and α represents the output-effort
elasticity. We wish to maximize a discounted logarithmic
utility function of the output, which leads us to the
following objective functional (Arrow and Kruz [1970])
J˜(R(·), c(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt ln
(
Y (t)
)
dt→ max
=
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt ln C
(
c(t)R(t)
)α
dt→ max,
where ρ > 0 is a discount factor. It can easily be shown
that the same maximizing pair (R(·), c(·)) will be obtained
by maximizing the following functional
J(R(·), c(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt ln
(
c(t)R(t)
)
dt→ max.
We take J(R(·), c(·)) as our final objective functional.
4. THE OPTIMAL CONTROL PROBLEM
Based on the discussion in Sections 2 and 3, we arrive
at the following optimal control problem for renewable
resource consumption
R˙(t) = r R(t)
(
1− R(t)
K
)
− c(t)R(t),
R(0) = R0 > 0; c(t) > 0,
J(R(·), c(·)) =∫ ∞
0
e−ρt [ln(c(t)) + ln(R(t))] dt→ max.
(P1)
Some definitions are in order here. Firstly, by an admissible
control c(·) : [0,∞) → R in problem (P1) we mean a
locally bounded (bounded on any finite time interval) and
measurable function which is defined on the infinite half-
open time interval [0,∞) so that
∀T > 0, ∃MT ≥ 0 s.t. |c(t)| ≤MT .
Secondly, by an admissible trajectory R(·) : [0,∞) → R
corresponding to an admissible control c(·) in problem
(P1), we mean a (locally) absolutely continuous function
which is a solution of the differential equation in problem
(P1) on an infinite time interval [0,∞), subject to the
initial condition in problem (P1).
A pair (R(·), c(·)) where c(·) is an admissible control and
R(·) is the corresponding admissible trajectory is called an
admissible pair (or a process) in problem (P1).
The improper integral in problem (P1) is defined as
following
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J(R(·), c(·)) = lim
T→∞
∫ T
0
e−ρt [ln(c(t)) + ln(R(t))] dt, (1)
if the limit exists. To prove that the limit exists, we first
need to prove some intermediate statements.
Lemma 1. There is a function ω : [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞) such
that ω(t) → 0 as t → ∞ and for any admissible pair
(R(·), c(·)) the following inequality holds true:∫ T ′
T
e−ρt [ln(c(t)) + ln(R(t))] dt ≤ ω(T ), 0 ≤ T < T ′.
Proof: It is easy to see that R(t) is bounded from above
as
sup
t≥0
R(t) ≤ R¯ = max{R0,K}.
Hence, for arbitrary 0 ≤ T < T ′ we have∫ T ′
T
e−ρt [ln(c(t)) + ln(R(t))] dt
≤
∫ T ′
T
e−ρt (c(t)R(t)− 1) dt
≤
∫ T ′
T
e−ρt
[
rR(t)
(
1− R(t)
K
)
− R˙(t)
]
dt
≤ rR¯
ρ
(
e−ρT − e−ρT ′
)
+ e−ρT R¯
≤ ω(T ) = (r + ρ)R¯
ρ
e−ρT .

Lemma 2. For any admissible pair (R(·), c(·)) the limit in
equality (1) exists and is either finite or equals −∞.
Proof: Let us first define JT (R(·), c(·)) as
JT (R(·), c(·)) =
∫ T
0
e−ρt [ln(c(t)) + ln(R(t))] dt.
Next, we define a maximizing sequence {ζi} such that as
ζi →∞
Jζi(R(·), c(·))→
lim
T→∞
sup
(c(·),R(·))
∫ T
0
e−ρt [ln(c(t)) + ln(R(t))] dt.
Also, we define a minimizing sequence {τi} such that as
τi →∞
Jτi(R(·), c(·))→
lim
T→∞
inf
(c(·),R(·))
∫ T
0
e−ρt [ln(c(t)) + ln(R(t))] dt.
Now, observing the defined functional as ζi →∞, τi →∞
and following an indexing such that τi < ζi, i = 1, 2, . . . ,
we can write
Jζi(c(·), R(·)) = Jτi(c(·), R(·))
+
∫ ζi
τi
e−ρt [ln(c(t)) + ln(R(t))] dt
≤ Jτi(c(·), R(·)) + ω(τi).
This implies
lim
T→∞
sup
(c(·),R(·))
∫ T
0
e−ρt [ln(c(t)) + ln(R(t))] dt
= lim
i→∞
Jζi(c(·), R(·)) ≤ lim
i→∞
Jτi(c(·), R(·))
= lim
T→∞
inf
(c(·),R(·))
∫ T
0
e−ρt [ln(c(t)) + ln(R(t))] dt.
As far as
lim
T→∞
sup
(c(·),R(·))
∫ T
0
e−ρt [ln(c(t)) + ln(R(t))] dt
≥ lim
T→∞
inf
(c(·),R(·))
∫ T
0
e−ρt [ln(c(t)) + ln(R(t))] dt,
we get
lim
T→∞
sup
(c(·),R(·))
∫ T
0
e−ρt [ln(c(t)) + ln(R(t))] dt
= lim
T→∞
inf
(c(·),R(·))
∫ T
0
e−ρt [ln(c(t)) + ln(R(t))] dt.
Hence the limit in equality (1) exists. Due to Lemma 1
this limit is finite or equals −∞. 
Now we are able to define an optimal pair for problem
(P1). By optimal admissible pair or optimal process in the
problem (P1) we mean an admissible pair (R∗(·), c∗(·))
such that on this pair the functional in equality (1) takes
on its maximal value and the latter is finite, that is,
J(R∗(·), c∗(·)) = sup
(R(·),c(·))
J(R(·), c(·)) > −∞.
Here the maximum is taken over all admissible pairs
(R(·), c(·)). Before we can establish the existence of such an
optimal pair, we must first prove the following statement
Lemma 3. For an optimal admissible pair (R∗(·), c∗(·)) (if
it exists)
J(R∗(·), c∗(·)) = lim
T→∞
∫ T
0
e−ρt [ln(c∗(t)) + ln(R)(t))] dt
>−∞
converges to a finite number.
Proof: From Lemma 1 we already have that for any
admissible pair, JT (R(·), c(·)) will either converge to −∞
or a finite number. It is easy to see that the admissible
control c˜(t) ≡ r/2, t ≥ 0, provides a finite value for the
functional. Hence, if optimal admissible pair (R∗(·), c∗(·))
exists then the corresponding value J(R∗(·), c∗(·)) must
also be finite. 
5. REDUCTION TO A PROBLEM WITH LINEAR
DYNAMICS
The state equation may be transformed into a linear one,
if the following variables and parameters are introduced
x(t) =
1
R(t)
, u(t) =
c(t)
R(t)
, A =
r
K
. (2)
Substituting this into problem (P1) gives us the following
new problem
x˙(t) = −r x(t) + u(t) +A,
x(0) = x0 > 0; u(t) > 0,
J1(x(·), u(·)) =∫ ∞
0
e−ρt [ln(u(t))− 2 ln(x(t))] dt→ max,
(P2)
where x(t) and u(t) are the auxiliary state and control
variables respectively at time t, r is the intrinsic growth
rate of the resource, A is a parameter given by equality (2),
J1(x(·), u(·)) is the objective functional evaluated for the
functions x(·) and u(·) and ρ is a positive discount factor.
Note that structurally, problem (P2) is much simpler to
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evaluate than problem (P1) as it is a problem with linear
dynamics. Problem (P2) is equivalent to problem (P1) in
the following sense.
Lemma 4. For fixed R0, there is a one-one correspon-
dence between processes (R(·), c(·)) in problem (P1) and
(x(·), u(·)) in problem (P2), where both processes are
admissible in their corresponding problems. Moreover,
the corresponding values of the objective functionals
J(R(·), c(·)) and J1(x(·), u(·)) are equal for corresponding
processes where (R(·), c(·)) and (x(·), u(·)) are related by
equality (2).
Proof: First we show that an admissible pair in (P1)
corresponds to an admissible pair in (P2). Assume that
c(·) is locally bounded and measurable, and consider the
pair (R(·), c(·)). Now, from the state equation in (P1), we
have
R˙(t) = r R(t)
(
1− R(t)
K
)
−c(t)R(t); R(0) = R0 > 0.
We know from here that
R˙(t) ≥ −c(t)R(t) =⇒ R(t) ≥ R0e−
∫ t
0
c(s) ds
,
and
u(t) =
c(t)
R(t)
≤ c(t)
R0
e
∫ t
0
c(s) ds
.
As c(t) has been assumed to be locally bounded and
measurable to begin with, the above inequality tells us that
u(t) must also be locally bounded and measurable. Thus
an admissible pair in (P1) corresponds to an admissible
pair in (P2).
Next we show that an admissible pair in (P2) corresponds
to an admissible pair in (P1). Assume that the control u(t)
is locally bounded and measurable. The state equation in
(P2) is given as
x˙(t) = −r x(t) + u(t) +A; x(0) = x0 > 0.
As u(t) ≥ 0, this equation gives us the following inequality
x(t) ≥ x0e−r t =⇒ c(t) = u(t)
x(t)
≤ u(t)
x0
er t.
As u(t) has been assumed to be locally bounded and
measurable to begin with, the above inequality tells us that
c(t) must also be locally bounded and measurable. Thus
an admissible pair in (P2) corresponds to an admissible
pair in (P1).
Now we show that the value of the objective functionals
remain the same for corresponding admissible pairs in
problems (P1) and (P2). The objective functional in (P2)
has already been derived by making the substitutions of
equation (2) in (P1). The proof below shows that the
equality of the objective functionals holds in the reverse
direction as well.
J1(x(·), u(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt [ln(u(t))− 2 ln(x(t))] dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[
ln
(
c(t)
R(t)
)
− 2 ln
(
1
R(t)
)]
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt [ln(c(t))− ln(R(t)) + 2 ln(R(t))] dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt [ln(c(t)) + ln(R(t))] dt = J(R(·), c(·)).
This concludes the proof. 
Hence problems (P1) and (P2) are equivalent, and an
optimal solution in one, will correspond to an optimal
solution in the other. We choose to focus on (P2) as it
is simpler to solve.
6. APPLICATION OF PONTRYAGIN’S MAXIMUM
PRINCIPLE
Here we apply the current value formulation of Pontrya-
gin’s Maximum Principle to problem (P2). A detailed
account of the maximum principle for the related class
of problems is given by Aseev and Veliov [2012] and Aseev
et al. [2012].
Theorem 5. Let (x∗(·), u∗(·)) be an optimal process in
problem (P2). Then there exists an absolutely continuous
function λ(·) (the current value adjoint variable) such that
the triple (x∗(·), λ(·), u∗(·)) satisfies:
1) The Hamiltonian system
x˙∗(t) = −r x∗(t) + u∗(t) +A,
λ˙(t) = ρ λ(t)−Hx (x∗(t), u∗(t), λ(t)) ,
with the current value Hamiltonian
H(x, u, λ) = lnu− 2 lnx+ λ (−rx+ u+A) .
2) The maximality condition
u∗(t) = arg sup
u<0
H (x∗(t), u, λ(t)) .
3) The generalized transversality condition
λ(t) = eρtZ∗(t)
∫ ∞
t
φ(s) ds,
where φ(s) is given by
φ(s) = e−ρs[Z∗(s)]
−1 ∂
∂x
(ln(u∗(s))− 2 ln(x∗(s))) ,
and Z∗(t) is the normalized fundamental matrix of
the system
z˙(t) = − ∂
∂x
(−rx(t) + u(t) +A) z(t).
7. ANALYSIS OF THE HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM
From the maximality condition 2) in Theorem 5, we can
find u∗(t). Maximization of the current value Hamiltonian
H (x∗(t), u, λ(t)) leads us to the following
∂H
∂u
∣∣∣∣
u=u∗(t)
=
1
u∗(t)
+ λ(t) = 0 =⇒ u∗(t) = − 1
λ(t)
. (3)
To confirm that the expression for u∗(t) indeed maximizes
the current value Hamiltonian we evaluate the 2nd partial
derivative
∂2H
∂u2
∣∣∣∣
u=u∗(t)
= − 1
u2∗(t)
< 0,
which shows that u∗(t) indeed maximizes the current value
Hamiltonian. Replacing this into the Hamiltonian system
shown in Theorem 5 we get the following system
x˙(t) = −rx(t)− 1
λ(t)
+A = F (x, λ),
λ˙(t) = (ρ+ r)λ(t) +
2
x(t)
= G(x, λ).
(4)
We are interested in an equilibrium analysis of the Hamil-
tonian system (4), as stable equilibrium points of this
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system correspond directly to sustainable consumption. It
is easy to see that a unique equilibrium point exists, given
as
(x¯∗, λ¯) =
(
2A
r − ρ ,
ρ− r
A(r + ρ)
)
.
From here we see that the quadrant of the phase plane in
which the equilibrium point lies depends upon the values
of r and ρ. From equality (3), we can see that in order to
have a physically realizable equilibrium (x¯∗ > 0, u¯∗ > 0),
the point (x¯∗, λ¯) must lie in the 4th quadrant. From here
we see that this happens only when r > ρ.
The stability of the equilibrium can be observed by analyz-
ing the eigenvalues of the linearized system. The linearized
system about (x¯∗, λ¯) and its eigenvalues are given by[
−r A2(r+ρ)2
(ρ−r)2
− (r−ρ)22A2 r + ρ
]
, σ1,2 =
ρ
2
± 1
2
√
2r2 − ρ2.
By observing the expression above, we can see that the
eigenvalues may either be real numbers with different sign,
real numbers both with positive sign or complex numbers
both with positive real parts. We see that in order for them
to be real numbers with different sign, the following must
hold true√
2r2 − ρ2 > ρ =⇒ r > ρ.
Thus if r > ρ, then (x¯∗, λ¯) lies in the 3rd quadrant with
eigenvalues which are real numbers having different sign.
This corresponds to a saddle point (both for the linearized
and non-linear systems) which is sustainable if the state
is made to follow along the 2 stable trajectories. This is
illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Direction field of the Hamiltonian system (4).
The equilibrium point (x¯∗, λ¯) has been marked in red
and the stable trajectories are represented by the solid
curve in black. Here r = 5, ρ = 0.1 and A = 2.
7.1 The optimal feedback law
From Figure 1 it is apparent that the optimal trajectories
will lie along the stable trajectories. Let us call the
trajectory corresponding to x < x¯ as λ−(x) and the one
corresponding to x > x¯ as λ+(x). Using this information
and equality (3) we can get the optimal feedback law as
u∗(x) =

− 1λ−(x) , if x < x¯,
−A(r+ρ)ρ−r , if x = x¯,
− 1λ+(x) , if x > x¯.
which means that in order to find the optimal feedback,
we must be able to determine the trajectories λ−(x) and
λ+(x). We can do this by determining the solution of the
following differential equation passing through (x¯∗, λ¯)
dλ
dx
=
dλ
dt
× dt
dx
=
G(x, λ)
F (x, λ)
=
λ ((ρ+ r)λx+ 2)
x (−rλx− 1 +Aλ) .
An analytical solution to this nonlinear differential equa-
tion is difficult to obtain. However it is possible to solve
numerically. An example of the numerically obtained solu-
tion can be seen in Figure 2 where the auxiliary variables
have been translated into the variables of problem (P1).
Figure 2. A graphical representation of the optimal feed-
back for the same system depicted in Figure 1. The
equilibrium point (R¯∗, c¯∗) has been marked in red.
8. EXISTENCE OF OPTIMAL CONTROL
Pontryagin’s maximum principle describes a necessary
condition for the optimal control (if it exists). However, the
existence of the optimal control must be proved separately,
which is what we do here. Note that the argument given
here is valid only when r > ρ. When r ≤ ρ either an
optimal control does not exist, or sustainability is not
possible, and so it is not of our interest. Consider the
following optimal control problem
x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t)),
x(0) = x0 > 0, B1 ≤ u(t) ≤ B2,
J(R(·), c(·)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtg(x(t), u(t)) dt→ max.
(P3)
Here the control u(t) is bounded for all times. From
the standard existence result (see for example Aseev
et al. [2012]), we know that an optimal solution for such
problems exists. By this and from the results obtained for
problem (P2) and Figures 1 and 2, we can see that the
optimal control will be bounded as follows
u∗(t) ∈
[
1
L
,L
]
,
where the number L will be dependent only on the initial
condition x0 and will increase as x0 increases. But as
x0 is bounded (through R0), there will come a point
where L will become uniform and independent of x0. Thus
for a sufficiently large value of L, problem (P2) can be
considered equivalent to problem (P3). As the existence
of optimal control for (P3) is already established, this
guarantees the existence of optimal control in problem
(P2) and consequently in problem (P1).
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9. POLICY GUIDELINES FOR SUSTAINABILITY
Based on the analysis conducted in Section 7 we conclude
that in order to ensure the possibility of sustainable
consumption, the following condition must hold true
r > ρ, (5)
where r is the intrinsic growth rate of the resource, and ρ
is the positive discount factor. This condition implies the
following guidelines for policy makers
• Increase resource growth rate: Sometimes the
growth rate of the resource is so low that sustain-
ability might simply not be possible. Of course even
in this case a sufficiently low consumption rate can
stabilize the resource quantity at a certain level, but
it will not be sustainable in the sense of maximizing
the selected measure for welfare (Section 3). It may
also not always be possible to increase the growth rate
of the resource as this is an intrinsic property. But
we must realize when it is possible e.g. in wind and
solar farms by improving equipment technology, in
fisheries by providing an encouraging environment for
reproduction, in hydrology by channeling rainwater
and water from melting glaciers more effectively, and
so on.
• Plan long term: Decreasing the discount factor ρ
corresponds to giving more weight to future benefits.
If this factor is kept large, the only optimal solution
will be to consume maximum resource in the present
and not worry about the future. In other words, if
the planning horizon is too small, then the future is
so unimportant that it is more efficient to consume
as much as possible today. It is important to note
here that choosing a small discount factor is not just
a matter of choosing a parameter for an equation.
In order to enable policy makers to consider a large
planning horizon, there must be stability in the so-
ciety. In a society struck with chaos and instability,
there is a large uncertainty on what the future will
be. In this case it is not sensible to choose a large
planning horizon and thus, not possible to ensure
sustainability.
10. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have dealt with an infinite horizon optimal
control problem for renewable resource consumption. We
have proved that for our model, the optimal consumption
path is sustainable only when the intrinsic growth rate of
the resource is greater than the discount rate. Although
one might think beforehand that a high growth rate and
long term planning strategy are prerequisites for sustain-
able resource consumption, it might not be clear as to
exactly how high the growth rate or exactly how long
term the planning should be. The condition given by (5)
gives us some idea about the answer to these questions.
In the process we have also taken a step towards solving
a class of infinite horizon optimal control problems with
unbounded control, which may have applications other
than the problem of natural resource consumption.
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